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Abstract:	  This	  study	  examines	  how	  firm	  performance	  is	  driven	  jointly	  by	  individual	  firm-­‐
specific	  capabilities	  and	  the	  characteristics	  of	  networks	  in	  which	  firms	  are	  embedded.	  By	  
using	   business	   groups	   in	   emerging	   economies	   as	   the	   organizational	   lens	   and	   adopting	  
stochastic	   frontier	  estimation	   to	  measure	   firm	  capabilities,	  we	   find	   that	   the	  value	  of	  a	  
firm’s	   capability	   is	   contingent	   upon	   the	   structure	   and	   the	   content	   of	   the	   intra-­‐group	  
network	  in	  which	  it	  is	  embedded.	  Specifically,	  we	  find	  that	  a	  dense	  intra-­‐group	  network	  
is	   likely	   to	  make	   innovative	  capability	  more	  valuable,	  although	  this	  effect	  varies	  across	  
different	  types	  of	  network	  ties.	  While	  a	  dense	  network	  of	  intra-­‐group	  buyer-­‐supplier	  ties	  
and	  equity	   ties	   enhances	   the	   value	  of	   innovative	   capability,	   a	   dense	  network	  of	   intra-­‐
group	  directorship	  ties	  does	  not	  influence	  the	  efficacy	  of	  a	  firm’s	  innovative	  capability.	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1 Whether and How Network Structure Shapes
the Value of Firm Capabilities?
While some management scholars have argued that performance dif-
ferences between firms are due to their differing levels of organizational
capabilities (Wernerfelt 1984; Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993), social network re-
searchers have posited that performance differences stem from differences
in the structural attributes of the networks in which individual firms are em-
bedded (Granovetter, 1985; Burt, 1992; Gulati, 1999; McEvily and Marcus,
2005). For example, dense networks, in which firms are connected to each
other by a thick web of relations, are seen by some scholars as being the most
favorable type of network for firms that are part of such networks (Coleman,
1990). At the same time, however, others have argued that dense network
structures have a negative impact on firm performance (Burt, 2000). Despite
a growing consensus that both firm capabilities and network ties have sig-
nificant implications for firm performance, we know little about the effect
of network structures on the efficacy of firm capabilities, as well as whether
and how this effect varies across different types of network ties. This study
aims to fill this theoretical gap. Specifically, we examine how the overall
connectivity of firms within their social networks impacts the value of their
capabilities.
We use business groups in emerging economies as the organizational
lens to examine how a firm’s performance is driven by the interaction be-
tween its capabilities as well as the structure of the network in which it be-
longs. Business groups are a common organizational form across many de-
veloping and some developed economies. Sociologists often view business
groups as networks that have clear boundaries and whose member firms are
affiliated to each other via various formal and informal means (Granovetter,
1995).1 Individual affiliates within a group are legally independent firms,
implying that their performance is driven by their firm-specific capabilities.
At the same time, however, their membership in a business group suggests
that their performance is also partly determined by the structure of their
group, as well as the type of intra-group ties that exist in their group. De-
spite growing interest in business groups among researchers, the network-
specific contingencies under which groups influence their affiliates’ perfor-
mance remains under-studied. We examine how the variation in affiliate
performance across groups is driven jointly by group-level network struc-
ture and affiliate-level capability. The potential interactions between net-
work structures and firm capabilities warrant cross-level analyses of affiliate
performance.
In this study, we focus on a specific type of firm capability, namely, inno-
1 We use the word firm and affiliate interchangeably throughout the paper. For a more
detailed discussion on business groups, please see pages 8 and 9.
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vative capability. Firms with superior innovative capability create value by
detecting valuable new information, assimilating it, and successfully apply-
ing it (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). Moreover, interorganizational ties play
a key role in innovation-creating activities (Gulati, 1999; Ahuja, 2000), mak-
ing innovative capability an ideal choice to explore the relationship between
group networks and firm capabilities.
Following Stochastic Frontier Estimation (SFE), we view a firm’s inno-
vative capability as the technical efficiency with which it uses the resources or
inputs, such as R&D expenditures, at its disposal to achieve certain outputs,
such as patents (Dutta et al., 2005). While the use of the input-output ap-
proach to capability is relatively new in strategic management research, this
approach to operationalizing firm innovative capability captures the notion
of capability as a firm’s ability to efficiently combine a number of resources
to attain a certain goal (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993). It is also consistent
with the view that capabilities are intermediate goods that help improve
the productivity of a firm’s resources (Makadok, 2001).
The empirical setting of this study consists of 63 affiliates that belong
to 50 business groups in Taiwan between 1990 and 1998. The high level of
heterogeneity across business groups, in terms of the level of overall con-
nectivity between the affiliates within a group, makes Taiwan an interesting
setting. Our results suggest that while both firm-level capability and group-
level network structure influence affiliates’ performance, the former is more
valuable in groups with a dense network of ties. More interestingly, we find
that this complementarity between firm capability and group network is
contingent on the types of network ties: the impact of innovative capability
on firm performance is enhanced in the presence of buyer-supplier ties and
equity ties, but not directorship ties.
2 Background
This study draws from the literature on firm capabilities and networks.
While resources are productive factors controlled by a firm (Barney, 1991),
capabilities are the ability of firms to deploy those productive factors to at-
tain a desired goal (Amit and Shoemaker, 1993). Thus, a capability is the
ability to transform resources into economic rents. Although superior re-
sources per se bestow great advantages upon a firm, what is more important
for the firm is its ability to use those resources to continuously generate su-
perior rents (Dutta et al., 1999). A firm with superior capabilities enjoys a
competitive advantage, and this competitive advantage is sustained if these
capabilities are organizationally embedded, firm-specific, and thus hard to
transfer or copy across firms (Treacy and Wiersema, 1993; Peteraf, 1993).
While the capability literature (Teece and Pisano, 1994) states that a firm’s
performance is driven by its capabilities, it does not tell us how the effects of
capabilities may be shaped by the structure and content of a firm’s network
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relations. As individual firms increasingly become nodes in webs of formal
and informal relationships with other firms, three questions arise as to how
network ties influence the benefits of a firm’s own capabilities. First, are in-
dividual firm capabilities still relevant when a firm can rely on the resources
and capabilities of its network partners? Second, do network ties affect the
efficacy of firm capabilities by either complementing or diminishing them?
If network ties do influence the impact of firm capabilities on firm perfor-
mance, a subsequent question is whether this impact differs across distinct
types of ties.
In theory, network relations can strengthen as well as diminish the bene-
fits of individual firm capabilities by affecting the firm’s access to the knowl-
edge and resources needed to exploit its capabilities. For example, cer-
tain capabilities, such as those related to new product development, are
more beneficial to firms when networks provide access to complementary
resources and information that facilitate successful commercialization (Ahu-
ja, 2000). At the same time, however, having too many inter-organizational
ties can reduce the value of a firm’s capabilities by promoting insularity,
information leakage, and free riding (Uzzi, 1997; Burt, 2000). Thus, to the
extent that a firm is embedded in a network of formal and informal ties, the
structure of the network is likely to shape the effectiveness of its capabilities.
Prior studies have shed some light on the role of network structure in
shaping the value of capabilities. Tsai (2001) found that firms with high ab-
sorptive capacity enjoy better performance if they occupy central positions
in a network. Zaheer and Bell’s study (2005) indicated that a superior net-
work position, in the form of access to structural holes, enhances a firm’s
performance as it enables the firm to better exploit its innovative capabili-
ties. These studies have mainly focused on the impact of a firm’s embedded-
ness in a network of formal and informal relationships on the exploitation
of its capabilities.
However, relatively little is known about whether these effects differ
across different types of ties. Firms are embedded in networks formed by a
variety of ties, such as interlocking directorships, trade association member-
ships, and R&D collaborations. Different types of network ties differ in the
material and immaterial substances transferred through them (Podolny and
Baron, 1997). They also have distinct impacts on the behaviors and interac-
tions that characterize inter-firm relationships (Gulati and Westphal, 1999),
and thus have different performance implications. To obtain a more fine-
grained understanding of the mechanisms through which networks influ-
ence firm performance, both independently and jointly with firms’ internal
capabilities, it is important to consider the role of “network content”, i.e. the
type of ties prevalent in a network.
Rather than regarding all types of ties as equally beneficial to firm per-
formance, we examine the effects of three different types of intra-group ties
on the efficacy of innovative capability. These ties are: buyer-supplier ties,
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equity ties, and directorship ties. Buyer-supplier ties are created when affil-
iates within a group interact as buyers and suppliers. Equity ties exist when
affiliates own equity stakes in each other through cross-shareholdings. Di-
rectorship ties arise when individuals sit on the boards of multiple affiliates.
Besides examining the impact of different types of ties, we also shift the
level of analysis from the ego-network to the overall network. This com-
plements previous research that focused on the performance implications
of the ego-network structure, and hopefully, will shed light on the under-
studied role of the overall structure of the network in shaping the efficacy
of firm capabilities. In particular, we consider how the overall connectiv-
ity between firms within a network shapes the value of firm capability, after
controlling for the effect of the network position of individual firms. To cap-
ture overall network connectivity, we adopt the concept of network density,
defined as the ratio of the actual number of ties among firms within the net-
work to the total number of potential ties in that network. A highly dense
network makes it easier for network participants to leverage each others’ re-
sources (Coleman, 1988). It also induces bounded solidarity, stronger norms
about reciprocity, greater trust, and sanctions against opportunistic behav-
ior, thus facilitating knowledge transfer within the network (Granovetter,
1985; Coleman, 1990). Excessive density, however, may constrain network
members’ access to ideas and resources available beyond the network (Uzzi,
1997). In the absence of access to innovative ideas from outside the network,
the information available through network ties tends to be homogenous and
redundant and works to impede firm performance (Burt, 1992).
We investigate the contingent effect of network ties by analyzing how
the density of different types of network ties affects the value of firm capa-
bilities. We speculate that some types of network ties will enhance the value
of firm capabilities, while others may not.
3 Business Groups: A Type of Network
A business group is a common type of multi-business firm in developing
economies, frequently dominating a substantial fraction of a country’s pro-
ductive assets and influencing its technological development (Amsden and
Hikino, 1994; Granovetter, 1995). Although definitions vary across coun-
tries, business groups generally combine elements of conglomerate holding
companies and multidivisional corporations, creating a multi-business firm
that has been referred to as a network form of organization (Nohria and Ec-
cles, 1992). Like conglomerates, business groups provide a corporate finan-
cial structure that controls businesses in multiple industries (Williamson,
1985). They are also similar to multidivisional corporations in that the busi-
nesses within a business group operate with a substantial degree of interde-
pendence.
However, business groups are also unique in some ways. They are more
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stable and coordinated than conglomerates, but are less centralized than
their typical multidivisional counterparts (Granovetter, 1995). In this study,
we define business groups as networks of loosely coupled legally indepen-
dent firms, linked by long-standing formal and informal ties.
As a network of legally independent affiliates, the performance of each
individual affiliate is influenced by its individual capabilities. However, in-
dividual affiliates can also rely on other affiliates within the same group
for resources and information, implying that the performance of affiliates
will also be influenced by their network relations with other group mem-
bers. While both group-level network structure and affiliate-level capabili-
ties independently affect affiliate performance, the potential interactions be-
tween network structure and firm capabilities warrant a multi-level analy-
ses of how these two factors jointly shape affiliates’ performance. Moreover,
group affiliates usually maintain various types of network ties, enabling us
to explore how different types of network ties influence the impact of inno-
vative capability on performance in different ways.
In what follows, we develop two hypotheses to explore how business
groups would affect firm performance by shaping the efficacy of their inno-
vative capability. We first examine whether business groups influence the
relationship between affiliates’ innovative capability and their performance.
Next, we investigate how distinct types of intra-group ties shape the value
of innovative capability.
4 Hypotheses
4.1 Network Ties Shape the Benefits of Capability
A firm requires expertise in a set of complementary activities to exploit
its innovative capability. These activities include searching for the new
ideas, information and resources that constitute the material basis for inno-
vative activities, and an ability to recombine these new ideas and resources
with existing ideas and resources – a process which needs creativity, coop-
eration, and coordination.
The networks literature suggests that the degree of connectivity between
network partners significantly affects the exploitation of the focal firm’s in-
novative capability. There are two opposing viewpoints on the network
form that is the most beneficial: Burt (1992) advocates networks rich in
structural holes, while Coleman (1988, 1990) supports dense networks where
partners are closely tied to each other. Burt (1992) argues that the network
ties of a set of firms are redundant if they lead to the same members in
the network, since that implies that the firms share similar sources of ideas
and resources. In contrast, firms on either side of a structural hole will not
have any overlapping network ties. Thus, if they connect to each other, they
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would be able to access diverse flows of ideas and resources (Hargadon and
Sutton, 1997). Therefore, maximizing the presence of structural holes may
produce efficient and information-rich networks beneficial to the focal firm
(Burt, 1992). By connecting to mutually unconnected partners, the focal firm
benefit from accessing unique ideas and resources from remote partners,
and hearing about potential threats and opportunities in advance (Powell
and Smith-Doerr, 1994). The advantages provided by structural holes are
particularly valuable in terms of enhancing the value of the focal affiliate’s
innovative capability, because innovativeness is indispensable from novel
ideas and abundant resources.
On the contrary, Coleman (1988, 1990) argues that the focal firm may
benefit more from dense networks, as they are characterized by efficient re-
source sharing, enhanced trust and reduced opportunism. When firms are
closely connected with each other, ideas and resources pooled within the
network can freely flow among them. Firms are likely to trust each other
because their intensive interaction allows them to observe others’ actions,
which in turn facilitates resource-sharing, knowledge combination, joint
problem-solving and large relationship-specific investments (Zaheer and
Venkatraman, 1995; Dyer and Noboeka, 2000). Moreover, they may develop
shared routines of behavior and sanctions against opportunism, which en-
hance mutual understanding, cooperation and reciprocity, and finally lead
to more productive collaboration (Uzzi, 1997; Gulati, 1999). Network clo-
sure may promote the exploitation of innovative capability by facilitating
the recombination of new ideas and resources.
Considering the features of emerging economies where business groups
operate, we argue that a dense group network is more likely to enhance
the efficacy of affiliates’ innovative capability, and thus achieve higher prof-
itability. Emerging economies suffer from a relative lack of resources for af-
filiates to acquire, as well as underdeveloped infrastructure for arms-length
relationships to facilitate the exchange of information and resources. There-
fore, the pooling of crucial resources and the efficient internal coordina-
tion provided by business groups are crucial for enhancing affiliates’ per-
formance. In particular, to the extent that business groups are important
importers of advanced technologies, they may provide access to frontiers
of technology that are usually unavailable beyond the group in emerging
economies. Moreover, business groups are able to establish external link-
ages with innovative corporations from developed countries because of their
better reputation (Khanna and Palepu, 1997), providing opportunities for
group members to learn how to recombine resources more efficiently and
creatively. Therefore, in emerging economies characterized by scant re-
sources and underdeveloped institutions, the potential search benefits of
networks rich in structural holes are difficult to realize. Dense networks are
more likely to enhance the efficacy of a firm’s innovative capability by fa-
cilitating the collection of information and resources within the group, and
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the recombination of resources and ideas. Hence, we propose the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The relationship between a focal affiliate’s innovative capability
and its performance is moderated by the density of the intra-group network in which
it is embedded, with innovative capability becoming more valuable when the density
of the intra-group network increases.
4.2 The Moderating Effects of Network Ties: Tie-Content as a
Contingency
Although network ties may facilitate the exploitation of innovative ca-
pability, the relative benefits may vary across different types of ties because
of differences in the content of ties.
Group-wide buyer-supplier ties can enhance the value of the focal affili-
ate’s innovative capability by providing earlier access to information about
consumers’ potential demand. Firms with superior innovative capability
are likely to make better use of this information advantage to develop new
products in response to these opportunities (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).
Moreover, affiliates in a network replete with buyer-supplier ties are ex-
posed to novel and diverse ideas from customers and suppliers (von Hip-
pel, 1989; Teece, 1989), as the intensive interconnections facilitate fast and
efficient flows of information (Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001). Neverthe-
less, the external knowledge acquired will not be beneficial unless the affil-
iates are equipped with strong innovative capabilities, since successful in-
novation requires the ability to recombine existing information and known
knowledge into novel solutions (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Fleming, 2001).
The theoretical models of innovation inspired by recent advances in new-
growth theory in economics point out that the degree of innovation attained
by any single firm is related not only to its ability to obtain sufficient re-
sources, but also to its ability to recombine its own and external ideas into
new concepts (Weitzman, 1998). Affiliates which possess superior a inno-
vative capability and are embedded in a dense network of buyer-supplier
ties are expected to be able to better absorb, recombine and utilize the quick,
novel, and diverse knowledge provided by the dense network and success-
fully come up with timing innovations.
At the same time, dense buyer-supplier ties can also undermine the ex-
ploitation of affiliates’ innovative capability by making them insular. Exten-
sive internal ties might cause affiliates to focus internally, rather than search
the external environment for new ideas, thus limiting opportunities for in-
novation (Nelson and Winter, 1982). However, we expect that the positive
effects of intensive buyer-supplier ties on innovative capability will offset
the negative effects for two key reasons. First, as indicated above, affili-
ates with a strong innovative capability are better able to take advantage of
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knowledge passing through their buyer-supplier ties. Second, affiliates with
high levels of innovative capability are less likely to suffer from the nega-
tive effect of closed dense networks, relative to their less capable counter-
parts. Capable affiliates which possess innovation-friendly organizational
routines, efficient communication systems, and innovative professionals are
more likely to come up with novel ideas internally and be less dependent
upon the external sources of new ideas. Therefore, innovative affiliates in
dense networks of buyer-supplier ties will enhance performance by better
exploiting their innovative capabilities.
Exploiting innovative capability also requires sufficient capital to sup-
port trial-and-error innovation procedures. In emerging economies, where
many of the institutions that underpin the functions of a well-developed
capital market either do not exist or exist in relatively weak form, equity
ties among group affiliates provide access to internal capital markets and
credibility. This makes it easier for an affiliate to access complementary
resources from other affiliates. Such ties are of particular importance in
emerging economies where there are scant capital resources available be-
yond business groups (Chang and Hong, 2000). Therefore, affiliates with
more equity ties with other affiliates are more likely to enhance the value of
their own innovative capability, compare to those with fewer equity ties.
The final type of intra-group ties, directorship ties, is likely to devalu-
ate an affiliate’s innovative capability through several paths. First of all, the
highly concentrated authority among a few directors renders them informa-
tion-overloaded. Since it has been shown that decision-makers are limited
in their ability to process the received information when its amount exceeds
what they can process (Van Zandt, 2004), directors who sit on many boards
of a group’s affiliates are unable to disseminate useful information across
affiliates in time. Given the importance of efficient information flow and the
diffusion of new knowledge for innovation, the innovative activities of affil-
iates would be negatively affected by the problem of information overload.
Furthermore, many business groups in emerging economies are family-
controlled such that family members often hold the position of board chairs
of multiple affiliates. Family directors are loath to hire capable outside pro-
fessionals and invest in projects that require external support due to their
lack of trust in outsiders and an excessive desire to control the whole group
(Fukuyama, 1995; La Porta, et al., 1997; Morck and Yeung, 2004). Since hu-
man resource plays a key role in knowledge-creation processes, the short-
age of professionals would greatly undermine the innovativeness of affili-
ates. Finally, in order to maximize the profits of the entire group, the central
family may use the internal capital market to subsidize poorly performing
affiliates. This practice, called tunneling, deprives focal affiliates of the fi-
nancial capital needed for innovative activities. In addition, since innova-
tion may destroy the value of wealth possessed by family members, family
directors would favor the status quo and will tend to spend less on inno-
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vation to prevent Schumpeter’s (1934) creative destruction from becoming
“creative self-destruction”.
However, notwithstanding their potential negative effects on affiliates’
innovative capability, it is possible that directorship ties may actually pro-
mote innovative activities by facilitating internal coordination and reducing
transaction costs through frequent communications among directors and
family authorities (Hamilton, 1997; Chung, 2003). Nonetheless, we argue
that the negative consequences of family control on innovative capability
dominate for two reasons. First, affiliates that are capable of innovation will
be constrained by the inefficient information flow, lack of capable profes-
sionals, and deprivation of financial capital necessary for innovation. These
limitations will paralyze innovative activities and hence diminish the value
of innovative capability. Second, innovative affiliates are less likely to obtain
significant benefits from the enhanced internal coordination and reduced
transaction costs brought about by directorship ties because of the efficien-
cies of their existing routines and structures (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000).
In sum, considering the heterogeneity in the content of intra-group net-
work ties, we propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Different types of network ties moderate the relationship be-
tween an affiliate’s innovative capability and its performance to different degrees:
buyer-supplier ties and equity ties enhance the value of innovative capability, while
directorship ties reduce its value.
5 Data and Measures
We use Taiwan as the empirical setting for testing the hypotheses. While
Taiwan is famous for its small and medium sized enterprises, business gro-
ups are also important players in its corporate landscape (Hamilton and Big-
gart, 1988; Hamilton and Kao, 1990). Taiwan is an ideal setting for at least
three additional reasons: First, business group affiliated firms in Taiwan
have played important roles as innovators during a period in which Taiwan
moved from being primarily an imitator to becoming an important source of
innovation during the 1990s (Hobday, 1995). Between 1990 and 1999, busi-
ness group affiliates received roughly 40% of the US patents awarded to
Taiwanese enterprises. While affiliates such as United Microelectronic Cor-
poration (UMC group), Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company
(TSMC group), Winbond Electronics (Walsin Lihua group), and Hon Hai
Precision Industry Company (Hon Hai Group) have been successful as in-
novators, the variation in financial performance across affiliates with similar
levels of innovativeness but different group affiliations makes Taiwan espe-
cially intriguing for examining the interface between intra-group network
ties and affiliate capability.
Second, business groups in Taiwan are heterogeneous: they are formed
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via a rich variety of network ties, and their financial performance varies sig-
nificantly both within and across the groups. The ties that connect group
affiliates in Taiwan range from informal ties based on family, friendship, re-
ligion, language, and ethnicity (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001; Luo and Chung,
2005) to formal economic arrangements such as equity cross-holdings, di-
rect interlocks, and buyer-supplier agreements (Lincoln et al., 1996). In this
study, we examine the effect of three types of the most important and preva-
lent intra-group ties: buyer-supplier ties, equity ties, and directorship ties.
The variation across groups in terms of pattern of ties makes Taiwan partic-
ularly attractive for our study.
Third, business group membership is clearly defined in Taiwan. This
is in contrast to other countries, where the ambiguity of group boundaries
makes it difficult to examine the effects of group attributes on affiliates’ per-
formance. In Japan, for instance, a lack of family solidarity and govern-
mental encouragement of inter-group activities obscures the boundaries of
the keiretsu (Saxonhouse, 1993; Weinstein and Yafeh, 1995). In Taiwan, by
contrast, cultural norms, such as patrilineal family connections and regional
kinship, enable group boundaries to be clearly delineated (Numazaki, 1986).
Owners and directors of group affiliates in Taiwan can be easily identified,
along with detailed data on operating, directorship, and investment ties.
Thus, the preponderance of business groups in Taiwan, together with the
heterogeneity of their network ties and the ease of identifying group affili-
ation, allows us to test fairly easily when and how business groups create
value for their affiliates.
5.1 Data and Sample
To test our hypotheses, we need business group-level data on the net-
work ties between group affiliates, and firm-level data on firms’ innovative
capability and performance. We refer to three data sources to obtain these
measures. Our major data source is the Business Groups in Taiwan (BGT) di-
rectory, compiled by China Credit Information Service (CCIS) in Taipei. CCIS
is the oldest and most prestigious credit-checking agency in Taiwan and is
affiliated to Standard and Poor’s in the United States. The BGT directory is
the most comprehensive and reliable source for business groups in Taiwan.
It contains information on the top 100 business groups (ranked by turnover)
and is confined to groups whose principal firms are registered in Taiwan.
CCIS defines a business group as “a coherent business organization includ-
ing several independent enterprises.” CCIS constructs its database by ex-
amining inter-organizational relationships such as the presence of a shared
identity, cross-shareholdings, and interlocking directorships.
According to BGT, the top 100 groups contributed 42% of national GDP
in the 1990s, indicating that they have a significant impact on business ac-
tivity within Taiwan. While several previous studies have relied on this
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source (Hamilton and Biggart, 1988; Claessens et al., Lang 2000; Khanna
and Rivkin, 2001), no prior research has translated and coded the data on
intra-group ties. This was obtained by collating the data on each group’s
intra-group buyer-supplier relationships, equity cross-holdings, and shared
directorships. The BGT database also provides demographic information
on business groups (e.g. group age, size, performance, and liability) and
their affiliates (e.g. firm age and size). When coding the data, we read the
BGT directories of 1990, 1994, and 1998, identified groups and affiliates, and
manually transcribed information about each group and its affiliates.
Measuring firm innovative capability and performance requires detailed
information, which is only available for publicly listed firms in Taiwan.
Therefore, the list of focal firms was confined to affiliate firms that were
listed on Taiwan’s Stock Market2. Innovative capability was measured by
examining each firm’s R&D expenditure, obtained from the Taiwan Eco-
nomic Journal Data Bank3 (http://www.tej.com.tw), and its number of suc-
cessful patent applications. The latter was sourced from the online database
of the Taiwanese Intellectual Property Office (http://www.patent.org.tw),
which collects information on the patent applications of Taiwanese firms
since 1990. Financial data was obtained from the Taiwan Economic Journal
Data Bank to calculate each firm’s Tobin’s q, which was the performance
measure we used. Our final sample consisted of 100 observations for 63
listed firms belonging to 47 business groups for the years of 1990, 1994, and
1998. The four-year window allows sufficient variance in the focal firm’s
innovative capability as well as its group network structure.
Dependent Variable — Tobin’s q : We use Tobin’s q as our measure of
performance. It is defined as (market value of equity + book value of pre-
ferred stock + book value of debt)/(book value of assets), where the market
value of equity is calculated using closing stock prices on the last trading
day of the year (Khanna and Palepu, 2000). Tobin’s q has been widely used
in the business group literature, because of its advantages over accounting
measures. It reflects the market value of the firm in a timely manner, as it is
based on the evaluation of firm capabilities, which are inherently dynamic.
Moreover, Tobin’s q is independent of a firm’s scale of operation. This char-
acteristic matches our intent to capture the contribution of firm capabilities
to performance, and not the portion of performance that is attributable to a
large scale of operations or resource use.4
2 For groups with more than one listed firms, we included all the listed firms in that group
in our sample.
3 This database provides verified, consistent, and timely data about Taiwanese listed com-
panies.
4 Since ROA is plagued by business cycle effects and does not account for differences in
systematic risk, Tobin’s Q is considered to be more reliable (Khanna and Palepu, 2000).
However, we recognize that the illiquidity and disclosure problems of many emerging
economy stock markets, including Taiwan’s, makes the use of Tobin’s Q problematic.
Thus, we tested the robustness of our results by using ROA as the dependent variable,
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Independent Variables: Firm innovative capability is calculated in the
way consistent with Dutta et al. (1999). Details of the estimation are pro-
vided in Appendix 1 and 2.
Four variables are used to measure the characteristics of intra-group net-
work ties. The density of all ties is defined as the ratio of the actual to the po-
tential number of ties within a business group. Operating density is the ratio
of actual buyer-supplier ties within a business group to the total number of
potential buyer-supplier ties in that group. Equity density refers to the ratio
of actual equity ties within a business group to the total number of potential
equity ties in that group. Finally, director density is defined as the ratio of
actual directorship ties among affiliates within a business group to the total
number of potential director ties in that group.
Control Variables: We included two affiliate-level variables to capture
other influences on performance. Affiliate size denotes the total assets of the
affiliate (thousands of New Taiwanese dollars). Large affiliates may be bet-
ter positioned to acquire capabilities. Also, scale economies, in terms of
spreading the costs of implementing capabilities over a large base of opera-
tions, are greater in larger affiliates. Affiliate age refer to the number of years
from the establishment of the firm. Also, 19 industry categories are included
to control for variance in firm performance due to industry-level variables.
To the extent that firms within a group may share certain common group
specific attributes, error terms across affiliates within a group may correlate
with each other. Thus, a failure to control for group-specific heterogeneities
might lead to the problem of autocorrelation among affiliates within the
same group. We address this problem by including three group-level vari-
ables that address group-level influences on the development of affiliate
capability: group size records total group assets (in thousands of New Tai-
wanese dollars), group ROA refers to the annual group-level return on as-
sets, and group liability is measured as the ratio of debt to net worth.
The centrality measure uses degree centrality, which indicates the num-
ber of direct partners with which a focal affiliate has relationships. The cen-
trality of all ties is defined as the ratio of the number of network ties a fo-
cal affiliate maintains to the number of affiliates in its intra-group network.
Operating centrality is the ratio of the number of buyer-supplier ties a focal
affiliate maintains to the number of affiliates in its intra-group network. Eq-
uity centrality refers to the ratio of the number of equity ties a focal affiliate
maintains to the number of affiliates in its intra-group network. Director cen-
trality is defined as the ratio of the number of directorship ties a focal affiliate
maintains to the number of affiliates in its intra-group network. We did not
use other centrality measures, such as closeness centrality and betweenness
centrality (Freeman, 1977), due to the small size of our networks. We created
four degree centrality measures: one for each of the three types of tie and
one for all types of ties. In addition, we controlled for two other firm capa-
and they remain very similar.
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bilities, namely marketing capability and manufacturing capability, in the
sensitivity analysis because they influence both the efficacy of innovative
capability and the performance of the affiliate (Dutta et al., 1999). Details of
the estimation of the two capabilities are provided in Appendix 1 and 2.
6 Empirical Analyses
Our empirical analysis involves two steps. First, we estimate firm ca-
pabilities using stochastic frontier estimation (SFE). This approach views
capabilities as an “intermediate transformation ability” (Dutta et al., 1999)
that allows a firm to convert inputs available to the firm (i.e. its resources)
into desired outputs (i.e. its objectives). We expect that firms that are ef-
ficient in deploying their resources to have superior capabilities, and thus
perform better than those that are less efficient. SFE enables us to empiri-
cally estimate the efficient frontier (i.e. the desired goal) and thus the level
of productive efficiency (i.e. a firm’s capability) achieved by each firm in the
study. Second, we explore the impact of intra-group network, firm capabil-
ities, as well as their interactions on firm performance.
6.1 Summary Statistics
Table 1A shows that the number of group affiliates and listed affiliates in-
creased over time. Operating density (based on buyer-supplier ties) dropped
substantially, while director density kept rising. Operating density fell as
Taiwanese business groups diversified into service sectors during this pe-
riod (Amsden and Chu, 2003). The desire to preserve family control encour-
aged the maintenance of directorship ties.
Table 1A - Business Groups in Taiwan, 1990-1998: Affiliates, Network Density and
Innovative Capability
 1 
 
Year 
Number  
of groups 
Number  
of Group  
Affiliates 
Average Number  
of  
Group Affiliates 
Number  
of  Listed 
 Firms 
Mean   
operating  
density 
Mean 
equity 
density 
Mean director 
density 
Average  
Affiliate  
Innovative capability 
1990 15 250 16.7 15 0.159 0.242 0.293 0.894 
1994 27 951 35.2 27 0.106 0.270 0.323 0.913 
1998 49 1598 32.6 50 0.080 0.217 0.338 0.958 
Total 91 2970 32.6 92 0.115 0.243 0.318 0.922 
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Table 1B reports the correlations between the independent and depen-
dent variables, as well as their summary statistics. There is significant vari-
ation in affiliates’ performance during the period, with the maximum value
being 6.979 and the minimum 0.147. In addition, we note that there is sig-
nificant heterogeneity in innovative capability across firms in our sample,
with a standard deviation of 12.9%. This characteristic fits the prerequisite
for capabilities to serve as sources of competitive advantage, which is that
they should be heterogeneously distributed. Table 1B also indicates that the
density and centrality measures of the group network are highly correlated.
These suggest a need to exercise caution when putting both of them in a re-
gression. Since the correlation of equity density and equity centrality is the
lowest, we control for equity centrality in the following regressions.
6.2 Regression Results
Table 2 provides pooled regression results on affiliates’ performance us-
ing ordinary least square (OLS) estimation and Generalized Estimating Equa-
tions (GEE) as robustness check. To the extent that firms within a group
share certain group-specific attributes, error terms across firms in a group
may correlate with each other. To control for the autocorrelation between af-
filiates of the same business group, we cluster each affiliate around its group
affiliation. We tested Hypothesis 1 using three models.
Table 2 - Effects of all Types of Intra-Group Network Ties on the Tobinaˆs Q of Group
Affiliates Using OLS and GEE
 3 
 
  OLS  GEE 
Dependent variable  Tobin’s Q of Affiliate  Tobin’s Q of Affiliate 
   Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4   Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Control variable           
Innovative capability 
 6.683** 
(2.959) 
10.973*** 
(3.411) 
11.032*** 
(3.455) 
5.587** 
(2.093) 
 6.974*** 
(2.650) 
11.160*** 
(2.667) 
11.195*** 
(2.673) 
5.587** 
(2.161) 
Marketing capability 
 
   
1.655 
(1.321) 
 
   
1.655 
(1.065) 
Manufacturing capability 
 
   
16.706*** 
(1.809) 
 
   
16.706*** 
(1.945) 
Density of all ties 
 -0.631 
(0.840) 
-0.483 
(0.759) 
-0.635 
(0.873) 
0.299 
(0.764) 
 -0.527 
(0.646) 
-0.357 
(0.599) 
-0.450 
(0.767) 
0.300 
(0.625) 
Centrality of all ties 
 
  
0.077 
(0.324) 
0.190 
(0.293) 
 
  
0.046 
(0.241) 
0.190 
(0.192) 
Affiliate size (logged assets) 
 0.278 
(0.376) 
0.332 
(0.351) 
0.319 
(0.353) 
0.124 
(0.240) 
 0.249 
(0.385) 
0.290 
(0.359) 
0.281 
(0.362) 
0.123 
(0.272) 
Affiliate age 
 -0.010 
(0.006) 
-0.009* 
(0.005) 
-0.010 
(0.006) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
 -0.011** 
(0.005) 
-0.010** 
(0.005) 
-0.011** 
(0.005) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
Group size (logged assets) 
 -0.290 
(0.404) 
-0.438 
(0.359) 
-0.422 
(0.364) 
-0.124 
(0.254) 
 -0.270 
(0.408) 
-0.405 
(0.381) 
-0.394 
(0.385) 
-0.124 
(0.291) 
Group  return-on-assets 
 0.062*** 
(0.023) 
0.048** 
(0.023) 
0.047** 
(0.021) 
0.036* 
(0.020) 
 0.063*** 
(0.011) 
0.049*** 
(0.011) 
0.048*** 
(0.011) 
0.036*** 
(0.008) 
Group Liability 
 -0.073 
(0.083) 
-0.061 
(0.076) 
-0.060 
(0.077) 
0.017 
(0.058) 
 -0.057 
(0.083) 
-0.043 
(0.077) 
-0.043 
(0.077) 
0.017 
(0.060) 
Independent variable           
Innovative capability*Density of all ties 
 
 
0.283*** 
(0.081) 
0.284*** 
(0.081) 
0.169*** 
(0.059) 
 
 
0.281*** 
(0.071) 
0.282*** 
(0.071) 
0.169*** 
(0.056) 
Constant 
 -4.785* 
(2.726) 
-7.905** 
(3.178) 
-8.068** 
(3.273) 
-21.920*** 
(2.980) 
 -4.986* 
(2.770) 
-8.020*** 
(2.675) 
-8.116*** 
(2.720) 
-21.921*** 
(2.768) 
R-square  50.21% 57.05% 57.09% 75.62%  N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Number of observations  100 100 100 100  100 100 100 100 
 
*** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. Standard errors are in the paren-
theses. Dummy variables for industry are included in the models, but not shown in the table.
Model 1 includes all of the control variables, and serves as the baseline
model. The interaction between innovative capability and the density of
all ties was included in Model 2. Consistent with our expectations, the sig-
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nificantly positive sign (P<0.01) on the term Innovative capability* Density of
all ties implies that a firm’s innovative capability positively moderates the
relation between network density and firm performance. As a robustness
check, we controlled for the effect of network position by adding the cen-
trality of all ties in Model 3 and found the same result as Model 2. Therefore,
Hypothesis 1, which proposes that the density of a group’s network com-
plements the performance impacts of its affiliates’ innovative capabilities, is
supported.
The left half of Table 3 shows the results of the five OLS models that
were used to test Hypothesis 2, which posited that the complementarity of
network ties to a firm’s innovative capability varies across different types
of ties. The first three models include three interaction terms, consisting of
the interaction of innovative capability and the three types of intra-group
ties, in isolation. The results indicate that buyer-supplier ties and equity ties
significantly enhance the value of innovative capability, while directorship
ties do not influence the relationship between innovative capability and per-
formance. When all of the interaction terms were included (Model 4), the
results remain similar, although the strength of the complementarity effect
of equity density decreased. To control for the effect of network position, we
included equity centrality in the model; however, the results do not change
substantially. These findings suggest that Hypothesis 2 is supported.
6.3 Sensitivity Analyses
We undertook several sensitivity analyses. First, in addition to cluster-
ing affiliates around their group affiliations control for group-specific het-
erogeneity, we also clustered around each affiliate to control for correlations
among firm-specific observations over time. The results were similar. Sec-
ond, although we did not find a significant moderating effect of director
density on the relationship between innovative capability and performance,
a question arises as to whether such moderating effect may be strengthened
as the level of family control increases. When accounting for family control
by including the ratio of family members among directors, we found that
family control reduced the value of innovative capability, which is support-
ive to our discussion about the role of family members sitting on boards.
Third, we addressed several alternative explanations to clarify causality.
For example, affiliates’ performance and group-level density could both be
attributed to a third unobserved variable. It has been pointed out in the
literature (Chintagunta et al., 1993) that failing to control for unobserved
heterogeneity may lead to inconsistent parameter estimates. We address
this problem by including a firm’s marketing capability and manufacturing
capability. Existing literature indicates that marketing capability and man-
ufacturing capability may enhance both firm performance and the efficacy
of the firm’s innovative capability (Dutta et al., 1999). Model 4 and Model 8
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Table 3 - Effects of Specific Type of Intra-Group Network Ties on the Tobinaˆs Q of
Group Affiliates Using OLS and GEE
 4 
 
  OLS  GEE 
Dependent variable   Tobin’s Q of Affiliate  Tobin’s Q of Affiliate 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5  Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Innovative capability 
 11.520** 
(4.417) 
9.904** 
(3.871) 
7.085** 
(3.085) 
10.748** 
(4.643) 
7.030** 
(3.364) 
 11.458*** 
(2.351) 
9.427*** 
(2.251) 
7.498*** 
(2.723) 
10.243*** 
(2.250) 
7.076*** 
(1.584) 
Marketing capability 
 
    
1.505* 
(0.818) 
 
    
1.485* 
(0.784) 
Manufacturing capability 
 
    
17.202*** 
(2.063) 
 
    
17.182*** 
(1.475) 
Operating density 
 0.411 
(1.133) 
  
-0.297 
(1.354) 
1.612 
(0.988) 
 0.668 
(0.613) 
  -0.239 (0.714) 
1.620*** 
(0.495) 
Equity density 
 
 
0.512 
(0.637) 
 
1.451** 
(0.630) 
0.601 
(0.496) 
 
 
0.587 
(0.555) 
 
1.547** 
(0.752) 
0.598 
(0.481) 
Director density 
 
  
-0.203 
(0.286) 
-0.149 
(0.293) 
-0.269 
(0.209) 
 
  -0.146 (0.327) 
-0.149 
(0.290) 
-0.270 
(0.192) 
Affiliate size (logged assets) 
 0.533 
(0.323) 
0.574 
(0.370) 
0.200 
(0.422) 
0.724** 
(0.328) 
0.367 
(0.257) 
 0.435 
(0. 337) 
0.549 
(0. 338) 
0.165 
(0. 386) 
0.735** 
(0.340) 
0.358* 
(0.215) 
Affiliate age 
 -0.012** 
(0.006) 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.010 
(0.006) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
 -0.013*** 
(0.003) 
-0.007* 
(0.004) 
-0.011** 
(0.005) 
-0.009 
(0.005) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
Group size (logged assets) 
 -0.506 
(0.357) 
-0.546 
(0.387) 
-0.193 
(0.458) 
-0.665* 
(0.361) 
-0.266 
(0.272) 
 -0.429 
(0.356) 
-0.534 (0.354) 
-0.171 
(0.406) 
-0.677* 
(0.352) 
-0.257 
(0.225) 
Group  return-on-assets 
 0.051*** 
(0.014) 
0.051*** 
(0.017) 
0.059** 
(0.023) 
0.052*** 
(0.013) 
0.033*** 
(0.010) 
 0.053*** 
(0.010) 
0. 055*** 
(0.009) 
0.060*** 
(0.011) 
0.054*** 
(0.009) 
0.033*** 
(0.006) 
Group Liability 
 -0.001 
(0.053) 
-0.037 
(0.065) 
-0.062 
(0.077) 
0.005 
(0.048) 
0.061 
(0.043) 
 0.020 
(0.070) 
-0.008 
(0.075) 
-0.045 
(0.083) 
-0.031 
(0.065) 
0.062 
(0.046) 
Equity centrality 
 
   
-0.137 
(0.247) 
0.253 
(0.162) 
 
   -0.091 (0.240) 
0.251 
(0.160) 
Innovative capability*Operating density 
 0.491*** 
(0.147) 
  
0.351* 
(0.186) 
0.336* 
(0.170) 
 0.502*** 
(0.083) 
  
0.315*** 
(0.105) 
0.335*** 
(0.070) 
Innovative capability*Equity density 
 
 
0.535*** 
(0.119) 
 
0.246** 
(0.112) 
0.231*** 
(0.078) 
 
 
0.559*** 
(0.090) 
 
0.316*** 
(0.118) 
0.231*** 
(0.080) 
Innovative capability*Director density 
 
  
0.120 
(0.146) 
-0.074 
(0.140) 
-0.099 
(0.083) 
 
  
0.137 
(0.119) 
-0.070 
(0.101) 
-0.097 
(0.066) 
Constant 
 -10.353** 
(4.468) 
-8.810** 
(3.759) 
-5.572* 
(2.875) 
-10.204** 
(4.810) 
-25.242*** 
(3.479) 
 -10.089*** 
(2.503) 
-8.286*** 
(2.393) 
-5.858** 
(2.873) 
-9.815*** 
(2.405) 
-25.244*** 
(2.137) 
R-square  64.10% 62.96%% 50.46% 67.39% 86.40%  N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Number of observations  100 100 100 100 100  100 100 100 100 100 
  
*** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. Standard errors are in the paren-
theses; Dummy variables for industry are included in the models.
of Table 2, and Model 5 and Model 10 of Table 3 suggest that our results are
robust to this argument.
Finally, we use a flexible random effects method known as the Gener-
alized Estimating Equations (GEE) for panel data (Liang and Zeger 1986).
A useful feature of the GEE approach for panel data estimation is that it
does not require the observations for all subjects to have the same correla-
tion structure. Instead, GEE allows us to specify within-group correlation
structures, as well as correct for heteroskedasticity. The right half of Tables 2
and 3 indicates that our results are materially unchanged when GEE is used
to control for within group correlations across multiple years as well as for
heteroskedasticity
7 Discussion
This study offers important implications for firm capability and social
network research. For firm capability research, the study suggests the need
to examine the value of capabilities when firms are embedded in a variety of
formal and informal relationships. Existing strategy research employing the
resource-based view of the firm explains variations in firm performance as
primarily arising from firms’ own capabilities (Barney, 1991). Our research,
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however, challenges this assertion by highlighting the effects of firms’ net-
work ties on the value of their own capabilities. Rather than operating in-
dependently, firms are intertwined with each other through network ties.
Consequently, the formal and informal ties connecting a focal firm to other
firms may appreciate or depreciate the value of the focal firm’s capabilities,
depending on the structure of the network, as well as the type of network
ties in which the firm is embedded. We find that a firm’s innovative ca-
pability is generally more valuable in a network with dense network ties
than in one with scant network ties. This is because the rich information
and ideas transferred through network ties stimulate the growth of inno-
vative capability. However, this effect is contingent on the type of network
ties. Buyer-supplier ties and equity ties significantly appreciate the value of
innovative capability, but directorship ties do not have any impact.
This study contributes to the network literature by incorporating firm
capabilities into the analytical framework of how social networks affect the
exploitation of firm capabilities, and thus firm performance. Extant net-
work literature points out that network density and a firm’s location in a
network significantly impact firm value. They also discuss how networks
lead to firm capability (McEvily and Zaheer, 1999; Mahmood et al., 2011).
However, little is known as to how the attributes of networks, such as the
type of network ties and the overall structure of the network, influence the
embedded firms’ capabilities, and thus firm value. We explore this ques-
tion and find that network density does impact firm capability, and that this
influence differs by the type of ties. Specifically, the value of innovative ca-
pability increases with operating density and equity density, while it is not
affected by directorship density.
By clarifying the interface between firm capability and business group
networks, this study also provides some managerial guidance to business
group managers. The positive interactive effects between firm innovative
capability and operating density and equity density suggest that in order to
achieve higher profitability by exploiting their innovative capability, affili-
ates should engage in maintaining these two types of ties with other group
members.
Besides the theoretical contributions, this study also contributes empir-
ically by modeling firm-specific capabilities, thus separating out the effects
of the resources owned by an affiliate from the effects of the resources owned
by the group on the performance of individual affiliates. Such new mea-
sures of firm-specific effects enable us to accurately identify the effect of
intra-group networks in a business group. The overall results suggest that
intra-group network ties are an important channel through which business
groups affect the profitability of their group members. Groups are efficient
in the sense that their internal networks minimize the transaction costs re-
sulting from market imperfections prevalent in emerging economies and
promote information exchange and resource sharing, which are hard to
http://www.rei.unipg.it/rei/article/view/172 19
REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND INSTITUTIONS, Vol. 6, Issue 1 - Winter-Spring 2015, Article 4
achieve via the market system (Khanna and Palepu, 1997).
8 Limitations and Directions for Future Research
A potential limitation of this study is that the business group network
may not be representative of other types of interfirm networks. Examining
the interplay between firm capability and network structure in other types
of interorganizational networks may help address the question of external
validity. Moreover, our empirical context is an emerging economy, Taiwan.
A multi-country analysis incorporating institutional differences could help
to evaluate the robustness of the results to other institutional contexts.
The study offers several avenues for further research. First, it would be
interesting to investigate how intra-group network ties will evolve as the
institutional environments of emerging economies improve. Intra-group
ties create value for group affiliates by promoting their resource sharing,
information exchange, and thus exploitation of innovative capability. Fu-
ture research may examine whether such benefits will mitigate as market
intermediaries develop and whether this in turn makes intra-group net-
works sparse. Second, just as we have shown that different types of ties
play distinct roles in shaping the value of firm capabilities, others might
study whether and how the efficacy of each type of ties will change as
a result of institutional transition and market development of emerging
economies. This will provide implications as to what types of ties business
groups should construct and maintain among the multiplex relationships
intertwining member firms in response to the changing environment. Third,
more disaggregated measures of firm capability, which go beyond func-
tional domains and focuses on individual projects (Ethiraj et al., 2005; Hen-
derson and Cockburn, 1994), may be useful for unmasking the mechanisms
by which group-level resource sharing benefits affiliates’ performance. Sec-
ond, just as capabilities affect firm performance, the latter also has an impact
on the former, making it difficult to establish causality. The huge windfall
generated from Samsung’s DRAM units in the early 1990s, for example, al-
lowed Samsung to make significant investments in furthering its innovative
capabilities. In this study, we addressed this issue of causality by consid-
ering multiple contingencies that provided the boundary conditions for the
underlying theoretical mechanisms by which firm capability influences per-
formance. Examining the simultaneous relationship between capabilities
and performance may be a useful next step. Finally, as Dutta and his col-
leagues lament, “As far as limitations go, the most obvious one is the use of
a parametric approach to estimating capabilities.” One promising alterna-
tive is to use semiparametric methods based on a combination of Stochastic
Frontier Estimation (SFE) and Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Such ex-
tensions would continue the task of unpacking the black box of networks
and firm capabilities.
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Appendix 1
Modeling innovative capability. We define a firm’s innovative capabil-
ity as its ability to allocate resources to achieve the maximum level of tech-
nological output given a certain level of deployed resources. Resources that
influence technological output (TECHOUTPUT) include a firm’s technolog-
ical base (TECHBASE) and its accumulated R&D expenditure (CUM R&D-
EXPENSE) (Dutta et al., 1999). Using a Cobb-Douglas production function,
we specify the innovation frontier as follows:
ln(TECHOUTPUT ) = β0 + β1 ln(TECHBASEit) +
β2 CUM R&DEXPENSEit + vit − uit
We use the number of successful Taiwanese local patent applications to
measure a firm’s technological output (TECHOUTPUT).5 U.S. patents are
used as a robustness check, with the results being qualitatively similar. As
R&D expenditures are likely to have a lagged impact on patent applica-
tion, we use a two-year lag with respect to the dates of R&D expenditures.
For robustness purpose, we experiment with concurrent and three-year lag
structures. The results are very similar.
Technological base (TECHBASE) is defined as the stock of technological
output, with a lower weight on the technological output in earlier years than
in later years. Specifically, technological base results from the estimation of
a Koyck lag function on technological output. Technological base for period
t is specified as
TECHBASEt =
t∑
k=1
δt−k TECHOUTPUTk,
where t = 1, ..., 5 periods. Here parameter δindicates the weight assigned
to the technological output in previous years. The higher the value of δ, the
greater the spillover effect from past levels of technological output.
Accumulated R&D expenditure (CUM R&DEXPENSE) is defined as the
stock of R&D expenditures, with lower weights on earlier R&D expendi-
tures than on later R&D expenditures in a Koyck lag structure. Specifically,
the accumulated R&D expenditure for period t is specified as
CUM R&DEXPENSEt =
t∑
k=1
δt−k RDEXPENSEk,
5 This measure treats all patents as equally important. We recognize that a better approach
would be to use quality-adjusted patent counts, which assign a weight to a firm’s patent
based on the number of citations the patent has received (Dutta et al, 1999). Due to the
unavailability of patent citation information for local patents, we use raw patent counts
as a measure of technological output.
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where t = 1, ..., 5 periods. Here γ is the weight assigned to R&D expendi-
tures in previous periods. The higher the value of γ, the greater the spillover
effect from R&D expenditures in previous periods. We expect both β1 and
β2 to be positive.
Modeling marketing capability. We defined the marketing capabil-
ity of a firm as its ability to allocate resources to achieve the maximum
level of sales given a certain level of its resources. Such determinant re-
sources to sales include technological base (TECHBASE), marketing expen-
diture (MARKETINGSTOCK), advertising expenditure (ADVSTOCK), and
instal-led base of customers (Dutta et al., 1999). Again, we adopt the Cobb-
Douglas production function and specify the sales frontier as follows:
ln(Salesit) = α0 +
19∑
k=1
αk Industryitk + α20 ln(ADSTOCKit) +
+ α21 ln(MARKSTOCKit) + α22 ln(TECHBASEit) +
+ α23 ln(INSTALLEDBASEit) + vit − uit
Modeling manufacturing capability. A firm’s manufacturing capability
is defined as its ability to deploy its resources efficiently to achieve the min-
imum level of cost of production, given a certain level of resources input.
Resources related to the cost of production include output (OUTPUT), labor
cost (LABORCOST), and the technological base (TECHBASE) (Dutta et al.,
1999). Once again, we use a Cobb-Douglas production function and specify
the cost frontier as follows:
ln(COSTit) = γ0 + γ1 ln(OUTPUTit) + γ2 ln(LABCOSTit) +
+ γ3 ln(TECHBASEit) + vit − uit
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Appendix 2
Table A1 - Measuring Innovative Capability Using Random Parameters Stochastic
Frontier Model
 6 
 
 
Variables Population Average Effect 
Variance of Unobserved 
Heterogeneity Component 
 
[ln(TECHBASE)] 
0.550*** 
(0.135) 
0.021*** 
(0.006) 
2ˆ [ln(CUM_R&DEXPENSE)] 
0.195** 
(0.024) 
0.013** 
(0.002) 
Composite Error Variance (
222
uve   ) 1.786** 
(0.032) 
 
Variance of Inefficiency Error Term (
2
u ) 
1.052** 
(0.018) 
 
Log-likelihood Function -2740.39***  
 
1ˆ
*** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. Standard errors are in the paren-
theses. The likelihood ratio test is used to test the overall significance of the model.
Table A2 - Measuring Marketing Capability Using Random Parameters Stochastic
Frontier Model
 7 
 
Variables Population Average Effect 
Variance of Unobserved 
Heterogeneity Component 
20ˆ [ln(ADSTOCK)] 
0.523** 
(0.039) 
0.193** 
(0.009) 
21ˆ [ln(MARKSTOCK)] 
0.897*** 
(0.004) 
0.128 
(0.122) 
22ˆ [ln(TECHBASE)] 
0.428*** 
(0.003) 
0.142* 
(0.047) 
23ˆ [ln(INSTALLEDBASE)] 
0.615*** 
(0.012) 
0.467** 
(0.018) 
Composite error variance (
222
uve   ) 
1.079*** 
(0.023) 
 
Variance of Inefficiency Error Term (
2
u ) 
1.008*** 
(0.019) 
 
Log-likelihood Function -639.74***  
 
*** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. Standard errors are in the paren-
theses. The likelihood ratio test is used to test the overall significance of the model.
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Table A3 - Measuring Manufacturing Capability Using Random Parameters Stochas-
tic Frontier Model
 8 
 
Variables Population Average Effect 
Variance of Unobserved 
Heterogeneity Component 
1ˆ [ln(OUTPUT)] 
0.761*** 
(0.004) 
0.048*** 
(0.001) 
2ˆ [ln(LABORCOST)] 
0.186*** 
(0.013) 
0.025** 
(0.012) 
3ˆ [ln(TECHBASE)] 
-0.163*** 
(0.007) 
0.107** 
(0.074) 
Composite error variance (
222
uve   ) 
1.934*** 
(0.101) 
 
Variance of Inefficiency Error Term (
2
u ) 
1.648*** 
(0.043) 
 
Log-likelihood Function -1753.86***  
 
*** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. Standard errors are in the paren-
theses. The likelihood ratio test is used to test the overall significance of the model.
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